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Executive Summary 
 
Cross-border flows play a key role in supporting investment and ultimately economic growth. Until 
recently, regulators tended to favor Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) because direct investment in the 
country’s productive assets has traditionally been viewed as more stable than portfolio flows. Yet recent 
strengthening of portfolio flows to emerging markets and to meet the existing investment needs in 
many countries is forcing a reassessment: Market-based investment cannot be ignored, and could 
bepart of public-private partnership to facilitate a more diversified and even allocation of international 
financial resources. 
With a special focus on Asia, the report first assesses the attractiveness of Asian countries based on the 
2016 Global Opportunity Index, then provides a closer look at the composition of Asia’s capital inflows—
focused on FDI and portfolio investment. 
Key Findings for Asia: 
 The 2016 GOI suggests that the region is strong when compared to the rest of the world, 
especially in terms of business perception. Yet it would benefit from a harmonization in the 
financial infrastructure and support systems and from a deepening of its financial markets. 
 Intra-regional capital flows are unevenly distributed. There is significant potential for capital 
flows to play a greater role in financing investment in Asia, but this will depend on financial 
integration of the region’s peripheral markets. 
 Asia as a whole has the potential for portfolio investment to play a greater role in capital flows;  
capital market deepening has the potential to attract institutional investors. 
 Major challenges to regional financial integration in Asia include: 
o Corporate debt and the reemergence of currency mismatch. 
o Lack of regional coordination of capital controls and other macroprudential policy that 
may influence potential investors’ decisions. 
Key Findings for Capital flows: 
 Portfolio flow composition shows that concerns regarding volatility should be reframed as 
concerns regarding overexposure to certain type of financing that may fuel financial distress. 
 FDI can take many forms and is linked to different type of investors. A better understanding at a 
more granular level of FDI and more generally of capital flows is necessary  to design policy 
focused on attracting the type of funding needed by the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2016, China assumed the G20 presidency by declaring that it “stands ready to work together with all 
members toward an innovative, invigorated, interconnected, and inclusive world economy.” One of the 
key items in the agenda is the enhancement of “cooperation and coordination on Global Investment 
Policy,” a priority based on the clear understanding that investment is crucial to trade and economic 
growth. In preparation for their July meeting, both UNCTAD and the OECD pointed out that a majority of 
the 2015 investment policy changes introduced by the G20 countries enhanced openness to foreign 
investment. For the first time since its release, the UNCTAD-OECD monitoring exercise includes 
information regarding measures concerning international capital movements other than FDI. This 
change reflects the recent shift in regulators’ approach to capital flows. 
Capital is essential for economic growth, but domestic supply is limited and countries have to rely on 
international sources. Up to recently, regulators tended to favor foreign direct investments (FDI) inflows 
perceived to be a direct investment in the country’s productive assets and more stable than portfolio 
flows. Yet, recent strengthening of portfolio flows, especially channeled to emerging markets by 
institutional investors, and the existing investment gap in many countries are forcing a reassessment: 
market-based investment cannot be ignored and could become part of a public-private partnership to 
facilitate a more even allocation of international financial resources. Ultimately, diversification in the 
composition of capital flows is a pertinent issue for countries interested in enhancing their financial 
stability. 
Asia is an interesting case for a variety of reasons. First, it replaced Europe as the main destination of FDI 
in 2014. Second, the financial crisis of 1997 led several Asian countries to take a proactive approach to 
macroprudential policy tools such as capital flows control. The region’s resilience to the global crisis is 
commonly linked to these regulations. Third, the region’s economic heterogeneity contrasts with its 
numerous trade agreements and highlights the need for financial integration, such as the one planned 
by the ASEAN Economic Community, to maintain and strength regional growth. Chang, Kaltani, and 
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Loayza (2009) show that financial and trade liberalization tend to amplify one another’s impact on 
growth. Finally, the financial integration and development of Asia is important for the region itself and 
the world: As the fastest growing region for the near future, Asia may be not only the global growth 
driver, but also the lender of tomorrow for many developed economies.3  
This report investigates capital flows in Asia and their diversity or lack thereof. Its contribution to the 
public discussion is twofold. First, the 2016 Global Opportunity Index (GOI), reported only for the Asia 
and the Pacific region, provides an overview of the region’s attractiveness for investors. Each nation’s  
assessment is based on a combination of five categories, each one capturing a different aspect of the 
country’s appeal: economic fundamentals, financial services, business perception, institutional 
framework, and international standards and policy. Second, the report provides a more in depth look at 
the capital flows for a selected group of Asian countries.   
Our report highlights several points that can be summarized as follows. First, the 2016 GOI shows that 
the region appears strong when compared to the rest of the world, especially in terms of business 
perception. Yet, it would benefit from a harmonization in the financial infrastructure and support 
systems (banking, insurance, advice, network) and a deepening of the financial markets. Such changes 
would strengthen the region’s attractiveness for portfolio inflows and insure a more even distribution of 
capital flows in general. Second, the steps required to reach broader integration in the region should 
account for countries’ comparative advantages and be designed around the notion of complementarity 
among these economies. Finally, our analysis also reaches two conclusions that are relevant beyond 
Asia. While the volatility of portfolio flows is often cited as an issue, it shows that the problem is the 
overexposure to certain financing that may fuel financial distress. Similarly, FDI can also take many 
forms and is linked to different type of investors. There is a high degree of heterogeneity across 
countries in the form that FDI takes and who the investors are, which suggests that there is no “one size 
fits all” policy prescription for attracting investment. 
The report proceed as follows: Section 2 reports the 2016 GOI for the Asia-Pacific region s. Section 3 
discusses the composition of Asia’s capital inflows, especially FDI and portfolio investment, while Section 
4 focuses on market depth and financial stability. Finally, Section 5 assesses the potential and 
challenges.. 
                                                          
3 Karolyi et al. (2015) show that the past FDI pattern and trade agreements influence current international investment 
portfolios of emerging markets. 
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2. GOI: Asia Focus 
The Global Opportunity Index considers economic and financial factors that influence investment 
activities as well as key business, legal and regulatory policies that governments can modify to support 
and often drive investments. Overall, the GOI tracks countries’ performance on 54 variables aggregated 
in five categories, each measuring an aspect of the country’s attractiveness to investors. 
 Economic Fundamentals (EF) indicates the current economic strength of a country vis-à-vis the 
global economic outlook. The assessment focuses on the country’s macro-performance, trade 
openness, quality and structure of the labor force, and modern infrastructure. 
 Financial Services (FS) measures the size and access to financial services in a country by looking 
at the country’s financial infrastructure and access to credit.  
  Business Perception (BP) measures explicit and implicit costs associated with business 
operations such as tax burden, transparency, etc. 
 Institutional Framework (IF) measures the extent to which an individual country’s institutions 
provide a supportive network to businesses. 
 International Standards and Policy (ISP) reflects the extent to which a country’s institutions, 
policies, and legal system facilitate international integration by following international 
standards. 
The assigned composite index value is the average score of the five categories (called component 
scores). Each variable is normalized from 0 to 10. Within each category, the normalized variables are 
given equal weight and aggregated, resulting in a normalized category score between 10, indicating the 
most favorable conditions for investment, and 0, signaling the least favorable. The index covers 136 
countries.4 Table 1 reports the index when focusing on the 25 countries of the Asia-Pacific region, while 
the box plots presented in Figure 1 provide insightful information regarding the spread of the rankings 
across regions and categories. These box plots allow for a visual comparison of the overall ranking and 
the sub-ranking, as well as a comparison between the composite score distribution across regions (see 
Appendix A.0 for more details).  
The main messages of the 2016 GOI can be summarized as follows: 
                                                          
4 Based on data availability the 2016 edition ranks 123 countries. 
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- Overall, the spread of the Asia-Pacific region’s performance is in line with what is observed for 
the rest of the world which confirms the level of heterogeneity in the region. Economies such as 
Hong-Kong, New Zealand, Australia and Singapore rank in the top 10 globally, and 10 out of the 
25 economies considered in the region rank in the 2016 GOI top 50. 
- Overall the region appears strong when compared to the rest of the world, especially in terms of 
business perception. 
- The two categories that seem to be lagging are International Standards and Policy and Financial 
Services. 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of global and sub-categories rankings 
All regions    Asia-Pacific  Europe and North America 
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Table 1: Global Opportunity Index focusing on Asia 
Country Ranking 
Sub-categories 
Economic 
Fundamentals 
Financial 
Services 
Business 
Perception 
Institutional 
framework 
International 
Standards 
and Policy 
Hong Kong 1      
New Zealand 3      
Australia 5      
Singapore 6      
Japan 9      
South Korea 11      
Malaysia 26      
Thailand 41      
Kazakhstan 42      
China 46      
Mongolia 60      
Azerbaijan 62      
Indonesia 67      
Viet Nam 70      
Philippines 76      
India 79      
Sri Lanka 80      
Brunei  83      
Kyrgyzstan 90      
Tajikistan 96      
Nepal 99      
Cambodia 102      
Bhutan 107      
Pakistan 112      
Bangladesh 115      
 
1-10 26-50 51-75 76-99 100-125 
In the overall GOI 
– 
8 
 
3. The Composition of Asia’s Capital Inflows 
Capital inflows broadly encompass transactions that increase nonresidents’ financial claims on the 
country in question. These can come in many forms that  vary widely in terms of the type of economic 
activity financed and the type of foreign 
investor. These are grouped into three 
categories: foreign direct investment (FDI), 
portfolio investment, and banking inflows. 
Boxes 1 and 2 give definitions of inflows, 
outflows, and the three categories. 
Asia and the Pacific’s share of global capital 
inflows has grown rapidly, with the growth 
concentrated in FDI and banking inflows (see 
Figure 2).5 In 2014 and 2015 the region 
attracted attention for surpassing the euro 
area as the world’s top destination for FDI. 
(See, for example, United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, 2016.) However, 
this recent phenomenon is mainly due to a 
precipitous fall in FDI flows to the euro area 
from 2013 to 2014. During this time Asia’s FDI 
inflows grew at a steady but moderate pace, 
and even fell slightly in some Asian countries, 
notably China.6 
                                                          
5 Regional shares of total global capital inflows disaggregated by category—FDI; portfolio investment; and banking flows—for 
the same five-year periods as depicted in Figure 2 are provided in Appendix A.2. 
6 The euro area’s FDI inflows fell from $1.25 trillion in 2013 to $470 billion in 2014, driven mainly by decreases in Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands, while FDI to East Asia and the Pacific increased from $585 billion to $606 billion (calculations based on 
IMF International Financial Statistics). It should be noted that a significant amount of FDI inflows to the Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands are in holding companies and ultimately funds productive activity elsewhere (Jenniger and Fetzer, 2015). The time 
path of capital flows for a selection of East and Southeast Asian countries is provided in Appendix A.3. 
Box 1: Flows direction 
Capital inflows to a country capture transactions 
which generate changes in nonresidents’ financial 
claims on the country. For example, a foreign firm 
acquiring a stake of ownership in a domestic firm 
from its domestic owner via foreign direct 
investment (FDI) or a nonresident buying a bond 
issued by a domestic firm (or government) are 
forms of capital inflows. 
Capital outflows capture transactions which 
generate changes in residents’ financial claims on 
nonresidents. For example, a resident acquiring 
from a nonresident a direct ownership stake in a 
foreign firm or a resident’s purchase from a 
nonresident of a foreign stock are forms of capital 
outflows. 
Additional details are provided in Appendix A.1. 
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Box 2: Different Types of Capital Flows  
Foreign direct investment inflows mainly measure transactions that increase nonresidents’ 
direct equity in domestic firms with controlling interest, commonly defined as a share of 
ownership of at least 10 percent, net of any divestment. These include retained earnings. 
Loans from nonresident parent companies to their domestic subsidiaries, net of repayment, 
are also accounted for as FDI. 
Portfolio investment inflows consist of nonresidents’ purchases from residents of equity and 
debt securities originally issued by residents, net of nonresidents’ sales to residents of these 
securities. The securities mainly consist of common stock and bonds, the markets for which 
are collectively referred to as capital markets. Bonds originating from public as well as 
private issuers are included. 
Any capital flows not accounted for as FDI or portfolio investment are grouped together as 
banking flows. These consist mainly of loans (net of repayment) from nonresidents, 
primarily foreign banks; nonresidents’ deposits in domestic banks; and domestic firms’ trade 
credit and other accounts payable to nonresidents. 
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Figure 2. Global capital flows by destination region 
2002-2006 Average          2010-2014 Average 
 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics; authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Regional country groups follow World Bank classifications, but are restricted to countries with complete data available 
for both five-year periods.7 East Asia and the Pacific includes Australia, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, S. Korea, 
Laos, Macao, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and a 
number of small Pacific island nations.8 
With China facing structural challenges to sustain growth and the onset of a severe aging problem, and 
Japan long in decline, investors’ attention has increasingly turned to the heterogeneous set of small- and 
medium-sized countries that make up the rest of the region. Whether these countries can maintain the 
region’s status as the world’s preeminent destination of capital flows will depend on their coordinated 
ability to achieve regional financial integration. 
When the composition of Asia and the Pacific’s capital inflows are viewed in aggregate, the portfolio 
investment component is still in large part a story of Japan, which accounted for 53 percent of the total 
for the 2002-2006 period and 42 percent for 2010-2014. While a relative stagnation of inflows to 
Japan—reflected in the decrease in its share of the regional total—explains part of the decrease in 
                                                          
7 The 2010-2014 period was selected based on having the latest data available for enough countries to construct reasonably 
comprehensive group aggregates, and the 2002-2006 period was selected on the basis that it precedes the global financial crisis 
while also avoiding contamination from direct effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
8 Malaysia is excluded from the sample due to incomplete data on banking flows. 
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portfolio investment as a proportion of Asia’ total capital inflows, the same basic pattern holds for a 
grouping that excludes Japan, as shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Composition of capital inflows, selected Asian countries, 1996-2015 
 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook. 
Notes: The group consists of China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam.9 India and Indonesia lack data for 2015 and Hong Kong lacks data for 1996-1997; these breaks in 
comparability are indicated with dashed lines. 
Figure 3 shows that while all three types of capital flows to Asia have grown substantially over the last 
two decades, collectively keeping pace with the region’s economic growth, portfolio investment has 
lagged. Portfolio investment inflows to the region as a whole are significantly smaller than FDI or 
banking inflows. 
Furthermore, it illustrates that the components of Asia’s capital inflows show significantly different 
behavior. FDI tends to be the most stable form of capital flows, while banking flows are the least 
stable—being highly procyclical and sensitive to external shocks—and portfolio investment falls 
somewhere in between. Thus, given the region’s heavy reliance on banking, a greater role for portfolio 
                                                          
9 East and Southeast Asian countries were selected based on data availability, with Japan excluded in order to focus on other 
countries in the region; Malaysia is excluded from the sample due to incomplete data on banking flows. 
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investment inflows would not necessarily raise the overall volatility of the region’s inflows—even setting 
aside the possibility that deepening capital markets may lead to more stable portfolio investment flows. 
One other noteworthy development in Asia’s pattern of capital inflows is the reversal of the banking and 
portfolio components in 2015. This reversal was largely comprised of reductions in loans and deposits in 
China, and thus mainly reflects factors specific to that country—for example an unwinding of the carry 
trade—rather than a general regional phenomenon.10 Relatively minor roles in the reversal were played 
by reductions in deposits in Hong Kong and Singapore and portfolio disinvestment in Hong Kong and 
Thailand.11 
a. The Composition of Asian Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 
FDI inflows can be sorted into three main categories: (1) M&A and greenfield investment, (2) increases 
in equity via retained earnings, and (3) loans from foreign parents to their subsidiaries in the reporting 
country. M&A and greenfield investment make up the most straightforward form of FDI, in which a non-
resident buys (controlling interest in) or establishes a firm. A more disaggregated look at the balance of 
payments data (sourced from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics) shows that M&A and 
greenfield investment comprise a slight majority of FDI, accounting for 54 percent of total FDI inflows 
into Asia and the Pacific between 2005 and 2014 (compared to 56 percent of global FDI flows over the 
same period). 
Foreign investors may also increase equity in home firms via retained earnings. This form of FDI is 
significant in Asia, accounting for 24 percent of FDI between 2005 and 2014 (and 18 percent of global 
FDI). It may constitute reinvestment, or may be held by the firm as cash or financial assets or used to 
service liabilities. While strictly speaking this is also true of some part of the flows counted as M&A and 
greenfield investment, these financial uses play a greater role in the case of retained earnings. The uses 
of this relatively flexible component of FDI vary significantly between countries and over time within a 
given country. Between 2005 and 2014, retained earnings accounted for 80 percent of FDI in Hong Kong 
                                                          
10 Chinese capital flows during this period are explored by Savard, Wilhelmus, and Wong (2016). 
11 Deposit and loan inflows are roughly equal in magnitude on average for the region as a whole, but for most countries in the 
region loan inflows are somewhat greater than deposits, with the notable exceptions of China where the two components are 
about equal in importance, and Hong Kong and Singapore where inflows of deposits tend to be significantly greater than 
inflows of loans (Appendix A.3). 
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on average, 65 percent in Korea, and 57 percent in Thailand; in the other countries in the region this 
component of FDI is moderate or insignificant.12 
Lastly, the debt type of FDI flow accounted for 14 percent of FDI into Asia and the Pacific between 2005 
and 2014 (compared to 21 percent for its share of global FDI). Use of this type of investment flow varies 
significantly within the region as well. These loans from foreign parent companies to their subsidiaries 
accounted for 37 percent of FDI inflows for Mongolia over the period, 36 percent in the Philippines, and 
-49 percent in Malaysia (reflecting repayment; this component accounted for 100 percent of Malaysia’s 
FDI inflows in some earlier years, likely driven by particular forms of capital controls). The debt 
component makes up smaller though still significant (typically 5 to 20 percent) of FDI inflows in most 
other Asian countries. 
While most foreign direct investors are multinational enterprises in industries related—either 
horizontally or vertically—to that of the target company, private equity and venture capital (VC) firms 
have emerged as sources of funding as well. Sovereign wealth funds like Singapore’s Temasek Holdings 
have been early players in the region, investing in local VC firms and setting the stage for the entry of 
foreign VC firms. Private equity, VC firms, and sovereign wealth funds will likely play a growing role in 
FDI in the region over time. Presently they mainly perform niche roles, for example investing in frontier 
markets in the Mekong Delta region, and in the IT, health, and biotech sectors in the region’s relatively 
advanced economies, mainly Singapore and Malaysia. (See Figure 4 for recent trends in these two 
countries.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 These particular countries have 2015 data available, but 2014 is used as the cut-off year for comparison to the regional 
aggregate; including 2015 does not make a substantial difference in the averages. 
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Figure 4. Venture capital in Singapore and Malaysia. 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters. 
Note: *2016 data are for Jan. 1 through July 26. 
There is significant scope for greater FDI between Asian countries in building and restructuring global 
value chains, as well as in businesses oriented toward satisfying local consumer demand as incomes rise 
and access to credit expands.13 While intra-regional FDI between East and Southeast Asian countries is 
substantial on aggregate, in large part this is accounted for by flows between China and Hong Kong 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015). Even leaving these two countries aside to examine FDI between 
Southeast Asia’s small- and medium-sized countries, the lion’s share of intra-regional investment is 
accounted for by only a few countries, Singapore and Malaysia in particular. Box 3 illustrates this by 
zooming in on M&A between firms in ASEAN countries. 
In summary, East and Southeast Asian countries have had broad success in attracting FDI but through a 
variety of channels. There is a high degree of heterogeneity across countries in the form that FDI takes 
and who the investors are. This suggests that there is no “one size fits all” policy prescription for 
attracting investment. At the same time, intra-regional FDI in particular is unevenly distributed. Thus, 
there is significant potential for intraregional FDI to play a greater role in financing investment in 
                                                          
13 To some extent investment in global value chains has already shifted within the region, for example with a movement of 
electronics manufacturing from China to Vietnam (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2016) 
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Southeast Asia, but this will depend on an expansion of financial integration in the region to its 
peripheral markets. 
Box 3. Singapore and Malaysia dominate intra-regional M&A 
Mergers & Acquisitions: Singapore and Malaysia Are the Big Players 
A substantial portion of FDI between Southeast Asian countries is in the form of M&A. Table B.1 
summarizes deal-level data on M&A bilaterally. It shows a strong regional heterogeneity with most of 
the deals concentrated in a few countries. Singapore and Malaysia, and to a lesser Thailand, are home to 
the acquiring firm in the vast majority of deals. The bulk of target firms are in Singapore, Indonesia (with 
its attractive consumer market as the largest economy in the region), and secondarily in Malaysia and 
Thailand. 
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Table B.1. Mergers and acquisitions between acquirer and target firms in ASEAN 6 countries. Number of 
deals and total deal value in US$ millions, 2002-2015 Totals 
   Acquirer Country     
  Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Total 
 
Target 
Indonesia 
 
106 
($3,700) 
2 
($8) 
91 
($4,600) 
13 
($285) 
 212 
($8,600) 
Country Malaysia 4 
($205) 
 3 
($321) 
187 
($3,700) 
4 
($31) 
 198 
($4,200) 
 Philippines  12 
($177) 
 12 
($36) 
4 
($125) 
 28 
($338) 
 Singapore 14 
($657) 
143 
($8,800) 
5 
($83) 
 12 
($10,100*) 
1 
($70) 
175 
($19,700) 
 Thailand  40 
($723) 
1 
($101) 
54 
($3,600) 
  95 
($4,500) 
 Vietnam  10 
($110) 
2 
($55) 
13 
($112) 
7 
($108) 
 32 
($385) 
 Total 18 
($862) 
311 
($13,500) 
13 
($568) 
357 
($12,100) 
40 
($10,600*) 
1 
($70) 
740 
($37,700) 
Sources: Bloomberg, authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Deal counts are underestimated due to missing deals and incomplete information on the acquirers’ and their targets’ 
countries of residence. Deal value is still more underestimated due to missing data on deal value for 25 percent of those deals 
which have sufficient data to be included in deal counts. Total deal values greater than $1 billion are rounded to the nearest 
$100 million. Only completed deals are reported. Year attribution is based on date of deal completion rather than 
announcement. The year 2002 was selected as the start year simply because it is the first year with a large sample of deal level 
data on cross-border M&A available from Bloomberg. *More than 80 percent of the total deal value of Thai acquisitions for the 
period are accounted for by one deal completed in 2013, the acquisition by ThaiBev (primarily in the brewing and distillation 
business) of roughly a two-thirds share of Fraser and Neave (a diversified company with food and beverage and publishing 
businesses) for about $8.58 billion. 
From 2002 to 2015 the intra-ASEAN share of ASEAN’s total inward cross-border M&A decreased from 40 
percent of deals completed between 2002 and 2006, to 26 percent of deals completed between 2010 
and 2015. At the same time the intra-ASEAN share in terms of deal value rose from 22 percent to 31 
percent, driven by a catching up of average intra-regional deal size which increased from $22 million to 
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$82 million, compared to a change from $40 million to $69 million for ASEAN’s inward deals overall. 
While larger deals may be a sign of greater sophistication, which in one sense is a promising sign for the 
future of investment among ASEAN countries, it is sobering to note the context. This space is still 
dominated by acquirers in Singapore and Malaysia, while the Philippines and Vietnam—and to an even 
greater degree Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar—continue to lag. 
 
Heterogeneity in Portfolio Investment Inflows 
Asian countries are highly heterogeneous in the level of development and the structure of their financial 
markets. Any measure of capital inflows into the region as a whole obscures this heterogeneity both in 
terms of the magnitude (relative to economic size) and in the composition of inflows. This heterogeneity 
is illustrated in Figure 5. Perhaps counterintuitively, the financial centers of Hong Kong and Singapore 
attract little portfolio investment as a proportion of their total capital inflows. Together with China, they 
help explain the low share of portfolio investment in the region’s total inflows. 
Figure 5: Capital Inflows by type, 2011-2015 annual average 
 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook; authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Only countries with complete data for the 5-year period are depicted (this excludes Cambodia, India, and Indonesia). 
*Malaysia lacks data on banking inflows, so in this case only the other two components are shown. 
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These three countries—China, Hong Kong, and Singapore—do have significant capital markets, as 
reflected in the Financial Services component of the 2016 GOI. In addition to well capitalized stock 
markets, they have sizeable markets for corporate as well as public bonds (although bond markets are 
notably smaller than stock markets in the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore). Nevertheless, for all three 
countries portfolio inflows are small relative to FDI and banking inflows. For China, FDI inflows are 
dominant; for Hong Kong and Singapore both banking and FDI inflows are large relative to portfolio 
inflows. However, in the case of Hong Kong it should be noted that portfolio inflows are large for its 
economic size. 
South Korea and Malaysia likewise have developed capital markets, and unlike the above three 
countries portfolio investment flows into Korea and Malaysia make up a large proportion of total capital 
inflows.14 Thailand roughly follows the same pattern, albeit with somewhat smaller capital markets in 
terms of capitalization relative to GDP. 
Indonesia and the Philippines have sizeable stock markets and markets for public bonds for their 
economic size (even more so for the Philippines than Indonesia in both cases), but had insignificant 
markets for corporate bonds until a very recent increase in issuance.15 Outside of the immediate East 
and Southeast Asian region—but of interest in itself and because it has some economic ties there—India 
fits this pattern as well. 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam receive very little portfolio inflow. Generally, they have fairly 
insignificant capital markets, although Vietnam does have a small but growing stock market (with 
market capitalization of 26 percent of GDP as of 2015). Mongolia and most Central Asian and South 
Asian countries also fit into this group. 
Comparing the equity and debt components of portfolio investment inflows (Appendix A.3), for Asia and 
the Pacific as a whole debt, securities account for 64 percent of portfolio investment inflows on average 
(for 2001-2015), and 73 percent for ASEAN countries. However, a substantial part of the debt 
component consists of sovereign bonds.16 
                                                          
14 Malaysia has incomplete balance of payments data for years after 2009 and for years earlier than 2002, so inferences 
regarding the overall composition of Malaysia’s capital inflows are based mainly on that older data from 2002 to 2009. 
15 Cambodia, India, and Indonesia are excluded from Figure 5 due to lacking annual balance of payments data for 2015 at the 
time of writing; inferences regarding the composition of their capital flows are based on annual data through 2014 and/or 
quarterly data through 2015q3. 
16 Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2014) give a detailed breakdown and analysis of the private and public components 
(on both the creditor and debtor sides) of net capital flows for a large set of developing countries. 
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Just as Asian countries’ portfolio investment inflows are highly heterogeneous in terms of magnitude 
and composition, so too are their portfolio investment outflows. To build a more complete picture of 
Asia’s participation in global capital markets, we now turn to the assets side. 
i. Asset Holdings in Asia 
The Financial Services component in the 2016 GOI is the most heterogeneous and spread out category. 
This does not necessarily come as a surprise: while Singapore and Hong Kong are financial hubs, many of 
the other Asian countries’ capital markets are still in a developing stage. One of the main difficulties for 
Asia in a globalizing world has been the approach towards free capital flows and how to protect 
domestic economies from sudden changes in flow direction. The recent increase in capital flows from 
and to Asia have been a hot-topic for some while now and with it more attention has been given to 
private security holdings of these countries, see Figure 6. To analyze those the IMF’s Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset is used, which records the stock of net acquisitions and 
disposal of private portfolio investments of a country.17 The actual holdings of most countries within the 
Asian region—Hong Kong and Singapore are an exception—are still rather low, mainly due to the fact 
that higher outflows are a new phenomenon. Even China only holds a stock of $287 billion, a number 
similar to that of Poland18.  
However, at a more granular level, security holdings can provide a partial view into the recent 
development and linkages within the region as well as global markets. After the financial crisis 
policymakers and regulators came to realize that it is necessary to get a deeper understanding of the 
international financial markets and more disaggregated datasets. Especially for individual countries it is 
essential to understand their holdings beyond the simple stock, e.g. in what asset classes and at what 
maturities. There are some key takeaways from the analysis of security holdings for some of the bigger 
ASEAN countries: 
o Total holdings have moved in line with increased capital outflow and inflows and have doubled 
since the financial crisis. 
o The share of holdings of neighboring countries is consistently growing and a major share is held 
within the region. 
                                                          
17 Mesny (2006). 
18 Poland has total investment holdings of $245 billion. 
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In line with the 2016 GOI, the major economies can be sorted into three groups, representing their 
current state of integration into global financial services. 
The first group is highly integrated into the global financial system and plays a key role in the capital 
flows to and from the region. Hong Kong and Singapore both hold roughly a trillion dollars or more in 
securities, $1.4 trillion and $965 billion respectively. Hong Kong has a special role in the flow of capital 
from and to China. Beginning in 2010 its total holdings of Chinese securities reached more than $400 
billion in 2015, more than double the pre-crisis amount. The second largest holdings of Hong Kong are in 
offshore centers, mainly the Cayman Islands with $343 billion of the total $362 billion. Most of them are 
in investment funds that are partly used to finance, among other activities, M&A abroad. This outlines 
one of the main difficulties of financial hubs’ data, as in the case of Hong Kong almost half of its total 
holdings are concentrated into the U.S. and offshore center, with the latter mainly being an 
intermediary. It should be mentioned that in the third group, Indonesia is a clear outlier when it comes 
to market size—a total capitalization of over half a trillion dollars. At the same time the market is still 
slightly behind the second group in regards to listed firms and the economy’s dependence on corporate 
finance through market-based instruments. 
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Figure 6: Total Security Holdings of Asian Countries. 
 
Source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey. 
Note: Chinese holdings are not available prior to 2015. 
 
Box 2. Singapore and Malaysia 
Singapore, in contrast to Hong Kong, has a much more diversified  holding pattern, with most of its 
investment holdings in the U.S., a total of $270 billion. Figure B.1 shows that the increase in U.S. 
holdings is mainly due to equity securities and long-term debt securities, mostly government bonds. The 
second largest holding is in the offshore category, mainly due to securities with undefined 
counterparties, which have increased ten-fold from less than $20 billion to more than $200 billion since 
2008. 
Malaysia has an overall small amount of total private portfolio investment holdings, $72 billion in 2015 
(see Figure B.2), with investments in Singapore and the U.S. accounting for more than 50 percent of the 
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total. This underlines Singapore’s special role as a globally connected financial hub, offering a variety of 
financial services not available in neighboring countries. Most of Malaysia’s exposure to the U.S. has 
been through equity rather than debt—$17.9 billion and to $3.7 billion, respectively—with equity 
accounting to more than 80 percent of total holdings. 
 
 
Figure B.1: Distribution of Singapore’s total debt and total investment holdings 
 
Source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey. 
Figure B.2. Malaysia’s total investment holdings and composition 
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Source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey. 
ii. Foreign Fund Flows 
From an investor standpoint, risk diversification and increased returns are a major motivation for 
internationalization of portfolios, especially in current times of low interest rates. Table 2 and Figure 7 
show that flows from funds domiciled in the U.S. to a sample of Southeast Asian countries are highly 
correlated, indicating the difficulties that investors have in collecting and interpreting country specific 
risks. These correlations measure how strongly U.S. funds’ investment (or disinvestment) in different 
countries are related to each other. High (Low) correlation, measured at highs of 1 (-1) between two 
countries indicates a perfect positive (inverse) relationship—e.g. a value of 1 would indicate that flows 
to (or reversals from) two given countries always move in tandem. 
The correlation is especially pronounced for bond flows, indicating that investor flows are less driven by 
country specific macroeconomic developments and are mainly dominated by overarching perceptions of 
the world and the region. This causes bond flows from foreign funds to move in unison when reacting to 
a global change in perception.19 Singapore is an exception - being a much larger and more sophisticated 
financial market than its ASEAN peers - showing flows that are much less aligned with its neighbors. 
                                                          
19 See Forbes et al. (2016) or Chantapacdepong and Shim (2014). 
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Table 2: Correlation of bond and equity flows from U.S. funds. 
 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam  
Indonesia  0.73 0.76 0.41 0.87 0.47 
Eq
u
ity Flo
w
s 
Malaysia 0.98  0.64 0.56 0.74 0.35 
Philippines 0.92 0.90  0.39 0.82 0.59 
Singapore 0.66 0.68 0.61  0.44 0.26 
Thailand 0.92 0.94 0.84 0.68  0.47 
Vietnam 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.66 0.86   
 Bond Flows   
Source: EPFR. 
 
The same cannot be said for equity flows, as these represent a direct claim on the residual value of a 
corporation and are much more dependent on the underlying corporation and the economy. There is 
however a clear cluster of countries that are highly correlated: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Thailand. This indicates that even though they are mainly driven by the corporation’s (expected) 
performance they are in part dependent on a common factor, such as a generally perceived overlap in 
business cycle or economic development.20 The picture is different for both Singapore and Vietnam, 
which are still driven by a regional component, but much more independent from the former cluster. 
This can be mainly explained by the difference in market structure in the two, as Singapore is a financial 
hub in the region that offers investors a much more distinctive investment environment and provides 
financial services that might not be available in the respective local markets. Vietnam on the other hand 
has a much smaller market compared to any of its regional peers, with a total market capitalization of 
domestic firms at less than $80 million. 
Policymakers often consider portfolio flows too volatile and procyclical for a country that is in the 
process of developing its domestic capital market and opening up to global capital flows. As a result, 
many developing countries, especially in Asia, use capital controls on portfolio flows that are perceived 
as being highly volatile. Figure 7 shows a different picture; the net flows are characterized by longer 
streaks, which in the case of bond flows lasted more than 3 years. While Equity flows are in fact more 
volatile than bond flows, they do show clear clustering and short-term directional trends. Hence, the 
                                                          
20 See Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001). 
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issue for developing countries is not the level of volatility but rather the overexposure to certain 
financing that may fuel financial distress. 
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Figure 7: Equity and bond flows from U.S. domiciled funds. 
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Source: EPFR. 
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4. Market Depth and Financial Integration 
The 2016 GOI and its components shows that Asia as a region has generally been quite successful in 
having the right ingredients in place to attract foreign investment Many of these countries have FDI 
friendly set of policies , which result in FDI representing a  large part of total capital flows for most of the 
region. Meanwhile, there is much more heterogeneity in portfolio flows. While FDI has often been 
viewed as a relatively desirable form of capital inflow due its relative stability, there are important 
reasons not to ignore the potential benefits of policies aimed at attracting other forms of capital flows, 
in particular by deepening capital markets to attract portfolio investment. 
a. The Potential for Asian Capital Market Integration 
Portfolio investment is especially suitable for large firms or projects, spreading the financing over a 
larger group of investors as compared to FDI deals or loans, and the benefit to investors of a relatively 
liquid asset means that financing can be less costly; for example, bond yields are typically lower than 
interest rates on loans. Portfolio investment can be the most efficacious means of financing large 
infrastructure projects carried out by public-private partnerships, which is of special interest in the 
region as infrastructure has been identified as a major area of investment need (Asian Development 
Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute, 2009; Ding, Lam, and Peiris, 2014) . 
Compared with FDI, and even with loans, portfolio investment attracts relatively passive investors. 
However, these include large institutional investors like sovereign wealth and pension funds, which so 
far have only dabbled in FDI and are—at least potentially—much greater players in the region’s capital 
markets than in FDI. Reasons for the limited development of capital markets in the region almost 
certainly include a lack of these institutional and other committed long term investors to contribute 
needed depth and stability.21 
Figure 8 shows that deeper bond markets—measured in terms of the cumulative position of foreign 
investors in a country’s debt securities—tend to return more stable flows of income to those investors. 
The causality likely goes both ways, with stable markets attracting investors, and depth leading to 
                                                          
21 In the case of bond markets, an additional barrier to markets deepening has been a limited role of government bond issuance 
due to generally prudent fiscal policy (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2006). 
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improved liquidity and stability. For Southeast Asia’s small- and medium-sized emerging market 
economies especially, economic size is likely a structural limitation to development of deep, 
sophisticated financial markets. Thus, for these countries greater financial integration within the group 
will be key for deepening markets and attracting institutional and other relatively long-horizon foreign 
investors. Having Singapore in the region—and as an ASEAN—means that greater integration may bring 
the benefits of access to an already thriving, globally connected financial hub. 
Figure 8: Countries with Greater Cumulative Portfolio Debt Inflows Tend to Generate Less Volatile 
Returns (2011-2015 quarterly) 
 
Source: Author's calculations from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. 
Notes: Each point represents one country. Position is measured as of the latest available quarter (ranging from 2014q4 to 
2015q4). All countries with non-zero data available on income flows for at least ten quarters in the 2011-2015 period and 
position data available for a quarter no earlier than 2014q4 are included. All East Asian countries (plus India) with data available 
are labeled. 
There have been some policy efforts in Southeast Asia toward greater regional financial integration for 
some time, for example the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, ASEAN+3, the ASEAN Banking 
Integration Framework, and the Chiang Mai Initiative. But by many objective measures, the region is no 
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more integrated than it was twenty years ago.22 Southeast Asia now appears to be uniquely well poised 
for intraregional integration compared to the previous phases of the region’s economic and financial 
history. This is due to a combination of the recent expansion of rapid economic growth to the region’s 
poorer countries; slow growth in high income countries; heterogeneity in demographics, with the 
potential for savings to flow from older to younger countries; and strong regional best practices in 
financial market regulations.23 The encroachment on Asian markets of a slew of international financial 
regulatory reforms in the West provides additional impetus for the region to look inward. However, 
significant challenges remain. 
b. Risks for the Region and Barriers to Financial Integration 
Corporate Debt and the Reemergence of Currency Mismatch 
For a period in Asia’s history leading up to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, currency mismatch between 
the assets and liabilities in the region’s international investment positions (IIPs) developed. Currency 
mismatch eventually proved to be a key source of vulnerability to shocks to capital flows and thus of 
financial and economic instability. This experience sparked policy initiatives to develop local currency 
bond markets, as well as providing the impetus to stockpile foreign exchange reserves as a buffer 
against external shocks. 
Over the following decade many Asian countries built up massive reserves. Some bond market 
development manifested as well, but as the specter of currency mismatch faded policy efforts toward 
this end lost their urgency. For several countries currency mismatch was not just reduced but in fact 
reversed, with foreign currency assets exceeding foreign currency liabilities (see Figure 9), putting them 
in a position where their external balance sheets would be strengthened by depreciation of the 
domestic currency.24 Asian countries weathered the global financial crisis relatively well, thanks in part 
to their reserves.25 Gourinchas, Rey, and Truempler (2012) show that regulatory quality likely played a 
                                                          
22 A detailed historical overview and analysis of financial integration in Asia is provided by Pongsaparn and Unteroberdoerster 
(2011). Recent trends in financial integration in Asia are explored by the International Monetary fund (2015). 
23 Overviews of the interplay between demographics and capital flows are provided by Higgins (1998), Domeij and Flodén 
(2006), and The World Bank (2013). 
24 See Bénétrix, Lane, and Shambaugh (2015), whose dataset on the currency composition of countries’ external assets and 
liabilities is publicly available. For an overview of asset valuation effects of the global financial crisis related to the composition 
of countries’ international investment positions, see Brunnermeier et al. (2012); for the underlying research and further details, 
see Gourinchas, Rey, and Truempler (2012). 
25 However, the degree to which emerging markets’ policy makers chose to allow currencies to depreciate vs. running down 
reserves varied widely; analyses of emerging markets’ complex and heterogeneous vulnerabilities and policy responses to the 
crisis are provided by Aizenman and Hutchison (2012) and Aizenman and Sun (2012). 
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role in reducing the vulnerability of balance sheets; the IIPs of countries with better regulatory quality 
tended to have lower (or indeed negative) asset valuation losses during the crisis. 
Figure 9: Foreign Currency Assets and Liabilities Preceding the 1997 and 2007-2009 Financial Crises 
 
Source: Data from Bénétrix, Lane, and Shambaugh (2015). 
Note: A supplemental figure for Singapore and Hong Kong is given in Appendix A.3. 
In the years since the crisis, however, currency mismatch has begun to reemerge. Overall corporate debt 
has risen (see Figure 10), and low U.S. interest rates have encouraged dollar borrowing. Some of this 
dollar funding is used to finance trade or inventories of tradable goods in the home country, which does 
not pose a serious risk in terms of currency mismatch, or holdings of fixed assets such as real estate 
which is potentially much more problematic.26 The borrowed dollars may also be traded for domestic 
currency financial assets to take advantage of interest rate differentials (and/or expected changes in the 
exchange rate), i.e. to pursue a carry trade strategy, in which case the borrowed dollars may ultimately 
end up, for a time, on the central bank’s balance sheet in the form of reserve assets. 
                                                          
26 This information is drawn from a summary of uses of dollar funding provided by McCauley, McGuire, and Sushko (2015). 
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Figure 10: Non-Financial Corporate Debt, 2006-2015 
 
Source: BIS Long Series on Total Credit. 
Recent research on currency mismatch emphasizes the role of dollar denominated transactions between 
residents, which are not reflected in external balance sheets and are thus missed in traditional measures 
of currency mismatch.27 The limited data show that these foreign currency financial transactions and 
positions between residents are significant, and furthermore that residents tend to increase their 
foreign currency transactions with each other in times of turmoil when borrowing in dollars abroad 
becomes more difficult, which points to this underappreciated dimension of currency mismatch as a 
potential source of systemic risk.28 However, the large foreign exchange holdings in most Asian countries 
(even after recent rundowns of reserves) puts the region’s governments and monetary authorities in a 
relatively strong position to intervene in the event that a financial crisis arises from currency mismatch. 
Capital Controls 
While some differences between Asian countries have the potential to fuel financial integration—for 
example differences in market size, areas of comparative advantage, and stage of demographic 
                                                          
27 See McCauley, McGuire, and Sushko (2015) and Chui, Kuruc, and Turner (2016); the general empirical patterns described in 
this paragraph are also drawn from these two sources. 
28 Data on capital flows and IIPs are typically not broken down by currency, and data on foreign currency financial transactions 
and positions between residents of a given country are even scarcer. The BIS and IMF have recently increased their efforts to 
collect data on currency denomination of transactions and positions to fill this gap. 
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transition—there are marked differences between countries’ policy positions and directions which have 
instead been barriers to integration. High amongst these are capital controls (see Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Capital Controls in East and Southeast Asia (0=least open; 1=most open) 
 
Source: Data from Chinn and Ito (2006). 
Notes: The figure shows the Chinn-Ito Index of capital openness, an aggregate measure of restrictions on capital account 
transactions, restrictions on current account transactions, existence of multiple exchange rates, and requirement to surrender 
export proceeds; the indicators used by Chinn and Ito (2006) to construct the index are drawn from the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements database. 
The region includes economies which are among the most open in the world, Singapore and Hong Kong 
(which were omitted from Figure 11 but both have Chinn-Ito capital openness index scores of 1 for both 
years depicted, indicating full capital openness). At the same time there are countries which are quite 
closed, or heading in that direction: China which is notorious for its capital controls; Thailand which has 
adopted Chinese levels of capital controls; Malaysia and the Philippines which have maintained 
moderately closed stances; and Indonesia which has adopted controls comparable to those of the latter 
two countries. On the other hand, an otherwise diverse set of countries—Cambodia, Korea, Mongolia, 
and Vietnam—are moving in the opposite direction, relaxing capital controls.29 Mongolia, which just a 
                                                          
29 These characterizations of countries’ policy positions and directions on capital controls do not reflect changes since 2014, the 
latest year for which the Chinn-Ito index was available at the time of writing. 
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few decades ago was a satellite state of the Soviet Union, is now one of the most open countries in the 
region. 
Whether the region’s small- and medium-sized countries manage to achieve financial integration will be 
a key determinant of how attractive they will be to foreign investors, depends on how the region’s 
configuration of capital controls evolves. Currently there is no coordinated regional policy path when it 
comes to capital controls. 
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Conclusion 
International financing is a key ingredient for continued economic growth and prosperity. Asia, for a 
long time, has been exceptionally successful in attracting foreign capital, a large part of it in the form of 
FDI. The 2016 GOI rankings and component scores help to identify some of the attributes and policies 
that have made certain Asian countries successful. At the same time it identify some regional 
shortcomings, underlining the fact that Asian countries are highly heterogeneous in a number of 
dimensions. The analysis of Asia’s capital inflows and asset holdings which supplements the ranking 
yields three key messages for policymakers and investors in Asia: (1) there is a need for regional financial 
integration, (2) the region could benefit from capital market deepening and a greater role of portfolio 
investment in its capital inflows, and (3) although the region is well poised for these developments to 
manifest, there are significant challenges to be overcome including rising corporate and household debt 
and lack of coordination on capital controls and financial regulations. 
Regional Financial Integration 
As shown throughout the sections, intra-regional flows are mainly limited to a very small number of 
country pairs, leaving plenty of room for increased market integration. The 2016 GOI shows that Asia as 
a whole should focus on improving the International Standards and Policy area, which is consistent with 
the pattern that regional integration is a work in progress. The path of integration will depend on Asian 
countries pursuing greater policy coordination, especially towards harmonization of financial regulations 
and infrastructure. 
At the same time, Asia’s heterogeneity—for example in demographics, income and wages, financial 
development, and economic comparative advantages—means that policy must be tailored to countries’ 
specificities. The regional model for integration needs to take into account countries’ complementarity. 
A broader regional financial integration would then lead to more evenly distributed intra-regional capital 
flows. 
Potential for Capital Market Deepening 
In a globalized world that is becoming ever more intertwined there is plenty of potential to stimulate 
market-based foreign financing in the region. In general, portfolio investment flows are much more 
sensitive to common shocks than FDI, but the range of flow reversal varies widely between instruments. 
Portfolio investments are relatively stable compared to banking flows, which currently comprise a large 
part of Asia’s capital inflows (and reversals of those flows). Capital market deepening has the potential 
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to attract different types of international investors—from institutional investors to private equity and 
venture capital firms—who make markets deeper and more liquid in a virtuous cycle. For example, 
venture capital is driven by long-term objectives and is especially beneficial for innovative sectors that 
are higher up the value chain, such as bio-tech and health care. 
Challenges 
But there are also a number of challenges to regional financial integration in Asia and some other 
important risks faced by the region. Corporate debt and currency mismatch have been on the rise since 
the financial crises in part due to a global glut of cheap credit, highlighting the risks posed by monetary 
policy spillover and other forms of external liquidity shocks. There is divergence in the development of 
capital openness of the region, reflecting a misalignment of regulatory objectives and a general lack of 
policy coordination. Furthermore, the region faces geopolitical risks which in some cases have hindered 
regional cooperation, although this topic is beyond the scope of analysis of this report. Overall, a more 
coordinated policy approach will not only be beneficial to individual countries but to Asia as a region and 
will be key in sustaining its attractiveness to investors. 
Beyond Asia 
This report highlights two features of capital flows that are not unique to Asia. First, a close look at 
portfolio flow composition shows that concerns regarding volatility should be reframed as concerns 
regarding overexposure to certain financing that may fuel financial distress. Second, FDI can also take 
many forms and is linked to different type of investors. A better understanding at a more granular level 
of FDI and, more generally, of capital flows is necessary in order to design policy that will focus on 
attracting the capital needed by the economy. 
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Appendices 
A.0. Boxplots 
Let focus on the first diagram, “ranking”, for all the regions to provide an illustration on how to read 
the information:  
- While the composite score can range from 0 to 10, the rectangle, or box, shows that half of the 
countries considered, that is between ranking 30 and 90, report a value between 4.5 and 6.2.  
- The whiskers represent the remaining fifty percent of the scores’ distribution. The top 25 %, that 
is ranking between 1 and 29, has a composite scone ranging from 6.2 and 8 out of 10. The 
lowest twenty-five percent, that is ranking from 91 to 123, has a composite score ranging from 
2.4 to 4.4. 
- The median, represented by the black line in the box, shows that 61 countries have a composite 
score less than 5. 
- Finally, some boxplots have black dots that represent extreme scores or outliers whose value is 
very different from what could be normally expected in the group of countries considered. That 
is countries performing extremely well or extremely poorly when compared with the group 
considered. 
- Institutional Framework is the category with highest degree of heterogeneity across the 
countries and that can be the most improved with most of the scores lower than 5, on a scale of 
10. New Zealand performs extremely well in this category when compared to the rest of the 
world 
However, the notion of extreme performance is relative to the group of countries considered: 
- New Zealand still performs extremely well, in terms of Institutional Framework, when compare 
to solely to countries within the Asia-Pacific region  
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A.1 Defining Capital Inflows and Outflows 
Capital flows broadly encompass transactions that change nonresidents’ holdings of financial claims on 
the country in question (“inflows”, accounted for on the liabilities side of the country’s balance of 
payments), and transactions that change residents’ holdings of financial claims abroad (“outflows,” on 
the assets side). The concept and measurement of capital flows and international investment positions 
used in this report follow the conventions of the balance of payments accounting system.30 In this 
system, flows and positions are linked such that the change in a country’s position—“position” being its 
level of international assets or liabilities at a given time—over the course of a time period is determined 
by (1) transactions in financial assets between residents and nonresidents, (2) any changes in volumes of 
foreign assets held by residents or domestic assets held by nonresidents that are not the result of 
transactions (for example, write-offs, debt forgiveness, or changes in residency), and (3) changes in 
valuation of assets (due to changes in price or exchange rates). 
Capital inflows to a country refer to the liabilities side of its balance of payments, capturing transactions 
which generate changes in nonresidents’ financial claims on the country. For example, a foreign firm 
acquiring a stake of ownership in a domestic firm from its domestic owner via foreign direct investment 
(FDI); a nonresident buying a bond issued by a domestic firm (or government) from a resident; a 
nonresident depositing funds in a domestic bank account in the country; or a nonresident lending to a 
domestic borrower, are all forms of capital inflows to the country. In this report, such transactions which 
increase nonresidents’ claims on the country are reported with a positive sign. Transactions which 
reduce nonresidents’ financial claims on the country are reported as negative inflows, for example if a 
nonresident sells an ownership stake in a domestic firm to a resident; if a nonresident makes a 
withdrawal from a domestic bank account; or if a resident repays some of the principal on a loan 
borrowed from a nonresident. When total capital inflows (or some component of capital inflows, for 
example total FDI inflows) are positive this means that in the relevant time period nonresidents 
undertook transactions which increased their financial claims on the country on aggregate, net of 
transactions which reduced their financial claims on the country. 
Similarly, capital outflows from a country refer to the assets side of its balance of payments, capturing 
transactions which generate changes in residents’ financial claims on nonresidents. Positive entries 
reflect transactions which increased residents’ claims abroad, for example a resident acquiring from a 
nonresident a direct ownership stake in a foreign firm; a resident’s purchase from a nonresident of a 
foreign stock, bond, or currency; a resident making a loan to a nonresident; or a resident depositing 
funds in a foreign bank account. Negative entries are generated by transactions which reduce residents’ 
claims on nonresidents; examples of such transactions are analogous to those given above for negative 
capital inflows. 
A special case is when claims on nonresidents are held by the reporting country’s central bank or other 
monetary authority in the form of official foreign-exchange reserves; these are measured in a separate 
account in the balance of payments, and are typically not included in total capital outflows. In this 
report, capital outflows do not include foreign-exchange reserves except when it is explicitly mentioned 
that foreign-exchange reserves are included. There is no analogous distinction on the liabilities side; that 
                                                          
30 For details see the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual (International Monetary Fund, 2013). 
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is, all transactions that generate changes in nonresidents’ claims on the reporting country are included 
in capital inflows, regardless of whether the nonresident in question is a foreign monetary authority and 
classifies the claim as reserves.31 
In the literature, the measures of capital inflows and outflows used in this report are sometimes termed 
“gross flows,” to signify that flows on the assets and liabilities sides are being reported separately as 
opposed to being netted out from one another. However, as described above, each of these measures 
results from netting negative entries from positive entries within the relevant side of the balance sheet, 
and thus is not gross in the sense of capturing the gross value of transactions. 
  
                                                          
31 In practice such a distinction on the inflows side would not make a difference for the vast majority of countries in any case, 
since only a small group of countries’ assets (those with “reserve currencies,” for example the United States) are held as 
reserves. 
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A.2 Global Capital Flows by Category and Destination Region (Supplement to Figure 2) 
  
  
  
 
   Source: IMF International Financial Statistics; authors’ calculations. 
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A.3 Capital Flows Composition, Selected Asian Countries, 1996-2015 
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Source: IMF International financial Statistics. 
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A.4 Foreign Assets and Liabilities Preceding the 1997 and 2007-2009 Financial Crises, 
Foreign & Domestic Currency Components, Hong Kong and Singapore (Supplement to 
Figure 9) 
 
Source: Data from Bénétrix, Lane, and Shambaugh (2015). 
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